The trans-Atlantic rift is not the function of one
president, but the product of deep ideological forces that for
generations have worked to shape the divergent views of Americans and
Europeans. Foremost among these are different attitudes toward identity
in general, and the relationship between identity and democracy in
particular.
To Europeans, identity and democracy are locked in a
zero-sum struggle. Strong identities, especially religious or national
identities, are seen as a threat to democratic life. This is what
Dominique Moisi, a special adviser at the French Institute of
International Relations, meant when he said in 2006 that "the
combination of religion and nationalism in America is frightening. We
feel betrayed by God and by nationalism, which is why we are building
the European Union as a barrier to religious warfare."
This attitude can be traced back to the French
Revolution, when the forces fighting under a universal banner of
"liberty, equality and fraternity" were pitted against the Church.
In contrast, the America to which pilgrims flocked in
search of religious freedom, and whose revolution amounted to an
assertion of national identity, has been able to reconcile identity and
freedom in a way no country has been able to match. That acute
observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, long ago noted the "intimate union of
the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty" that was pervasive in
America and made it so different than his native France.
The idea that strong identities are an inherent threat
to democracy and peace became further entrenched in Europe in the wake
of World War II. Exponents of what I call postidentity theories –
postnationalism, postmodernism and multiculturalism – argued that only
by shedding the particular identities that divide us could we build a
peaceful world. Supranational institutions such as the EU, the
International Court of Justice and the United Nations were supposed to
help overcome the prejudices of the past and forge a harmonious world
based on universal values and human rights.
While these ideas have penetrated academia and elite
thinking in the U.S., they remain at odds with the views of most
Americans, who see no inherent contradiction between maintaining strong
identities and the demands of democratic life. On the contrary, the
right to express one's identity is seen as fundamental. Exercising such
a right is regarded as acting in the best American tradition.
The controversy over whether Muslims should be able to
wear a veil in public schools underscores the profound difference in
attitudes between America and Europe. In Europe, large majorities
support a law banning the veil in public schools. In the U.S., students
wear the veil in public schools or state colleges largely without
controversy.
At the same time severe limits are placed on the
harmless expression of identity in the public square, some European
governments refuse to insist that Muslim minorities abide by basic
democratic norms. They turn a blind eye toward underage marriage,
genital mutilation and honor killings.
The reality is that Muslim identity has grown
stronger, has become more fundamentalist, and is increasingly
contemptuous of a vapid "European" identity that has little vitality.
All this may help explain why studies consistently show that efforts to
integrate Muslims into society are much less effective in Europe than
in America, where identity is much stronger.
Regardless of who wins in November, the attitudes of
Americans toward the role of identity in democratic life are unlikely
to change much. Relative to Europe, Americans will surely remain deeply
patriotic and much more committed to their faiths.
Europeans, meanwhile, may move closer to the Americans
in their views. The recent shift to the right in Europe – from the
victory of conservative leaders like Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and
Silvio Berlusconi to the surprise defeat of the leftist mayor of
London, Ken Livingston – might partially reflect a belated awareness
there that a unique heritage is under assault by a growing Muslim
fundamentalism.
The logic of the struggle against this fundamentalist
threat will inevitably demand the reassertion of the European national
and religious identities that are now threatened.
Europeans are now saying goodbye to Mr. Bush, and
hoping for the election of an American president who they believe
shares their sophisticated postnational, postmodern and multicultural
attitudes. But don't be surprised if, in the years ahead, European
leaders, in order to protect freedom and democracy at home, start
sounding more and more like the straight-shooting cowboy from abroad
they now love to hate.
Mr. Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident, is
chairman of the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies at the Shalem
Center in Jerusalem. He is the author, most recently, of "Defending
Identity: Its Indispensable Role in Protecting Democracy"
(PublicAffairs).
Recent Comments